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Article

Corporate Governance in an Age of
Separation of Ownership from Ownership
Usha Rodrigues†
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2008 spurred far-reaching government responses in the form of federal regulation: the immediate “bailout” legislation1 and the later Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).2
These initiatives shape in profound ways the capital structure
of financial institutions and the vibrancy of the global economy.
But what has been the impact on the mechanisms of corporate
governance? Congressional responses to the crisis sound in familiar keys, because they call for increased disclosure, greater
independence of board members, more say-on-pay, and proxy
access for shareholders.3 To this point, however, Congress has
failed to address a fundamental tension in modern corporate
stock ownership: the increasing use by long-term investors of
short-termist intermediaries (mainly mutual funds and hedge
funds), despite an inherent mismatch in their respective time
horizons.
Dodd-Frank and its bailout antecedents invoke remedies
that shareholder activists have developed over the past twenty
years to prod boards of directors of corporations whose share
prices underperform the market in the short term.4 My thesis is
that the use of these remedies in an effort to enhance long-term
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. The
author would like to thank Iman Anabtawi, Robert P. Bartlett III, Dan Coenen, Erik Gerding, Jeffrey Lipshaw, Brett McDonnell, Larry E. Ribstein, D.
Gordon Smith, and Leo E. Strine, Jr. for their helpful comments. Karim Jetha,
Meredith Lee, and Carl Rhodes provided valuable research assistance. Copyright © 2011 by Usha Rodrigues.
1. See infra notes 91–93.
2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.A.
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decisionmaking for individual companies is misguided and
counterproductive.5
Central to the post-crisis law of corporate governance are
reforms based on two key premises. The first premise is that
the financial crisis was the result of systemic risk, which in
turn arose from companies’ failure sufficiently to internalize
the long-term dangers of their conduct to both themselves and
the larger economy.6 The second premise is that increased
shareholder involvement will ameliorate this pernicious shorttermism.7 By short-termism, I mean the taking of actions that
result in a short-term gain, but which sacrifice the long-term
benefit of the firm to a suboptimal degree.
This Article focuses primarily on the flaws inherent in the
second premise of Congress’s bailout reforms. In particular, I
suggest that the government’s reform tactic of shareholder empowerment ignores the fact that the immediate shareholders of
the vast majority of publicly traded corporations have shortterm investment horizons that can be measured in months, or
even days.8 Each regulatory measure fails to take account of
the short-termist shareholder problem. Expanding the choices
of a myopic shareholder electorate to include shareholder nom5. To situate my argument within the literature, others have also criticized shareholder empowerment as an effective reform measure. See generally
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735
(2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-20, 2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Shareholder
Activism
and
Institutional
Investors],
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227.
6. See infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
8. This is not to mention the even shorter time horizons of flash traders,
who precipitated the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010. Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC
Launches Inquiry into Market’s Flash Crash, WASH. POST, May 21, 2010, at
A14, available at 2010 WLNR 10488275. Flash traders seek to exploit minimal
price differentials and hold shares for only minutes or seconds. See, e.g., Jenny
Anderson, S.E.C. Moves to Ban Edge Held by Fast Traders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 18348003 (“[T]he average [flash]
trade is executed, or completed, in less than 10 milliseconds and often as fast
as 5 milliseconds.”). This Article will ignore flash trading on the theory that
these traders, indifferent to corporate governance concerns, generate trading
volume without affecting corporate policies.
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inees will not make short sighted shareholder voters focus on
the long term. If they vote, they will simply pick similarly
short-termist directors. Worse still, empowering short-term investors to vote on executive pay might well have the perverse
effect of creating an incentive structure that encourages shortterm risk. Disclosure as reform, while politically expedient, relies on the market processing the information being disclosed
and pricing securities accordingly—a supposition called into serious question by recent empirical studies.9 More generally,
these empirical studies raise questions about the efficacy of
what has become the standard toolkit of shareholder activists
when ownership is no longer simply separate from control, but
also from ownership—that is, when the ultimate beneficial
owners of corporations do not themselves own shares in any
real sense, but instead rely on institutional fund managers and
other intermediaries.
Faced with these difficulties, Congress should contemplate
a very different approach to reform. Shareholder empowerment
is likely an imperfect tool to address systemic risk, given the
collective action problem, complacency, and other limitations.10
That said, the most promising shareholder empowerment
reform strategy involves aligning the interests of long-term investors and those of the funds through which they invest. Unfortunately, current regulation permits and even encourages
short-termism on the part of the managers of these intermediary funds.11 Even those funds with the longest of time horizons—including so-called target-date funds—operate in a manner that subordinates the interests of investors to those of the
funds themselves.12 Disclosure, the SEC’s proposed regulatory
fix, fails to address the problem with target-date funds because
investors in these funds are, by definition, not likely to be active monitors.
This Article accepts three propositions that others have
questioned. First, it views Congress’s legislation in this area as,

9. See discussion infra Part III.A.
10. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1670017 (discussing the complacency problem).
11. See, e.g., infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
12. Cf. Leslie Wayne, A Bead on Ordinary Investors, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 12109242 (illustrating the enormous
risks to investors).
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at least primarily, a sincere effort to deal with short-termism.13
One could view these reforms instead as the product of political
logrolling. From this perspective, the reforms were never intended to address the causes of the financial crisis, but were
merely a sop to corporate governance activists,14 creating a
dangerous placebo effect pursuant to which cosmetic governance changes would lull the public into thinking substantive
reform had occurred.15 A less cynical view holds that, if the
public truly believes that the reforms have created a safer, less
fraudulent, or more favorable investing climate (that is, if society swallows the placebo), then the reforms will be effective at
reassuring investors and have the positive effect of stabilizing
the economy. If this reassurance is ultimately misplaced, however, investors are merely duped into feeling an unwarranted
sense of security in the market. Whether one takes a sincere or
cynical view of the bailout’s corporate governance provisions,
this Article argues that their failure to address the new stockholding landscape, while purporting to address managerial
short-termism, is a problem that corporate scholars should take
seriously.
This Article also embraces a second proposition that some
scholars have questioned—namely, that long-term investors
are deserving of heightened protection.16 One can object to this
outlook on the ground that the long-term investor is already
adequately protected. Why? Because the long-term investor is,
after all, an investor. She is taking a risk in the hope of higher
return and, in an efficient market, long-term investors are
compensated for running risks, including systemic risk, by receiving a higher rate of return.17 In response, I posit that the
market in which long-term investors operate is not completely
efficient: the “true” value of shares does not always equal stock
price because of the informational asymmetries that exist be-

13. See infra Part II.B.
14. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1802, 1818–19 (2011).
15. See Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 65–66 (2006) (explaining the
placebo effect of law as objectively impacting behavior and resulting from law’s
manipulation of subjective perception).
16. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The ‘Innocent Shareholder’: An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
243, 246 (stating that long-term investors are “most in need of protection”).
17. Thanks to Larry Ribstein for raising this objection.
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tween managers and public investors.18 In other words, I assume that at least sometimes market prices reflect short-term
interests, rather than the long-term value of the firm, and that
the market does not fully price in systemic risk.
In addition, one may question whether long-term investors
exist at all today—if they ever did. The individuals we think of
as long-term investors—those saving for retirement or their
children’s college education—might be more properly seen as
short-term investors with long-term interests. Such investors,
so the argument goes, will be indifferent as to how that longterm goal is achieved; they may, indeed, prefer a series of
short-term investments that cumulatively result in a bigger
payoff than investments that are held for a period of many
years. If this suggestion is true, then focusing on the long-term
investor’s interests will not help the situation.
Even if we believe that no long-term investors exist, however, we still face a problem. It is in everyone’s best interest for
firms to be run for the long term. Stable firms create stable
employment, wealth, and goodwill that short-lived companies
cannot provide. The question our society faces is how to encourage long-lived firms when individual players, including
even long-horizoned investors, may be looking for a quick
payoff. While aligning the incentives of fund managers with
those of long-term investors remains the best alternative to
substantive government regulation, the efficacy or validity of
focusing on them remains in doubt. Shareholder empowerment
simply may not be an adequate tool for addressing systemic
risk. My core point is simply to offer a critique: the bailout’s
shareholder empowerment regulatory fixes are internally incoherent because they fail to address the short-termist realities of
shareholder ownership today.
I. THE NEW SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM
OWNERSHIP
The idea that shareholder empowerment will address managerial short-termism grounds itself in the Berle-Means vision
of the public corporation, first articulated in 1932,19 that has
shaped corporate law for decades. In The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means pit the
18. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 698–703.
19. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
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interests of the dispersed shareholder-owners of a public corporation against interests of the managers of the corporations
they own.20 The tale is one of disenfranchisement and loss of
control: because of their dispersal, shareholders are powerless
to discipline management.21
In the Berle-Means world, vertical agency costs are the
chief corporate concern.22 Managers can rent-seek unfettered
by any meaningful shareholder control. Corporate reforms such
as proxy access and say-on-pay attempt to mitigate these vertical agency costs by providing shareholders a voice to check
management’s excesses.23 Disclosure rules seek to reinforce the
power of shareholders, on the theory that some subset of motivated owners, proto-owners, or short-sellers will vigilantly
monitor all available information about the corporation and
buy or sell accordingly.24 The corporate governance provisions
of the bailout legislation, then, faithfully follows the BerleMeans shareholder-versus-manager script, according to the

20. See generally id.
21. Alternative models to the Berle-Means corporation have arisen, such
as Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen’s framework. Fama and Jensen view the
corporation as a contract rather than property. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael
C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302
(1983) (“An organization is the nexus of contracts . . . among owners of the factors of production and customers.” (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976))). Shareholders contract for the residual claim, decision rights are generally allocated to management, and the
outside board provides a monitoring role. Id. at 311–15. Importantly, however,
under the Fama-Jensen model, shareholders reserve the right to vote on important matters as a way to constrain managerial agency costs. Id. at 313. In
this world, shareholders share a single motivation: maximizing the value of
their residual claim. A conflict of interest among shareholders—what I have
termed a “separation of ownership from ownership”—thus matters even in
Fama and Jensen’s contractarian world, given its dependence on the shareholder vote as a corrective mechanism. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5,
at 665 (“The shareholders [in the Fama and Jensen model] emerge as ownersin-part, bearing the residual risk and, as voters, sharing in control at a step
removed from business decisionmaking and direct monitoring.”); Robert B.
Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 138
(2009) (“[T]he vote by shareholders exhibits less of the legitimizing function in
the selection of directors than one sees in a political election of a representative, and more of the error-correcting purpose as to directors’ behavior.”).
22. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 19.
23. See discussion infra Part II.A.
24. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
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common presupposition that “if management [i]s the problem,
shareholders must be the solution.”25
This line of logic, however, must confront a troubling practical reality: the ownership landscape of American public corporations has shifted dramatically over the past seventy-five
years. No longer do we have merely a separation of ownership
and control; we now also have a separation of ownership from
ownership.26 Individual long-term capital holders no longer
hold shares of corporations directly; the direct holders of shares
predominantly are institutional investors.27 As Jill Fisch has
observed, “the feasibility of improving corporate decisionmaking through shareholder empowerment depends critically
on the actions and incentives of those empowered shareholders.”28 We thus must consider whether the incentives created
for institutional investors—the “empowered shareholders” of
today—tilt toward the short term or may be otherwise biased.
Institutional investors come in different shapes and sizes.
Individuals saving for retirement or their children’s education—whose investing time horizons can be measured in decades—may hold stocks through mutual funds and pension
funds. Wealthier investors may use hedge funds. In each case,
the corporation’s vote holder is not the ultimate beneficial owner of the corporation, but instead an intermediary that enables

25. Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of
Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 335 (2011).
26. This resonant phrase comes from Vice Chancellor of the Delaware
Court of Chancery Leo Strine, and this section is largely indebted to his insights into the modern shift in stock ownership. See Leo E. Strine Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 5, 2009,
1:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine/
[hereinafter Strine, Excessive Risk-Taking].
27. In 2009, institutional investors owned fifty percent of total U.S. equities. Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership
from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 879 (2010) (citing BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/
Current/z1.pdf ). In 2007 institutional investors owned 76.4 percent of the
largest 1000 companies. Id. at 879–80 (citing Press Release, The Conference Bd.,
U.S. Institutional Investors Boost Ownership of U.S. Corporations to New Highs
(Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle
.aspx?id=184326501).
28. Id. at 879. Fisch’s article points out the problems securities intermediaries pose for shareholder empowerment, although not in the specific context
of governmental responses to the financial crisis. Id. at 879–84.
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the investor to own an interest in a mix of shares packaged as a
unitary investment vehicle.29
This mediated ownership gives rise to a troubling set of
horizontal conflicts. These conflicts exist when investors have
conflicts of interest, not with managers, but amongst themselves.30 If shareholders have different interests, most notably
divergent investment time horizons,31 then simply empowering
investors risks advantaging one group of shareholders to the
detriment of the rest. More fundamentally, the theory of shareholder empowerment is that shareholders, as the residual
claimants, will maximize long-term firm value because they are
last in line at the time of liquidation, and thus have strong reasons to guard against near-term collapse. But if some shareholders have a short-term perspective, or have idiosyncratic
causes to advance, then shareholder empowerment merely
substitutes a new horizontal conflict between shareholders in
place of the old vertical manager-shareholder conflict.32 These
short-term shareholders may well not vote at all or may sell
their shares to other investors if the vote is a valuable one. But
there will be some decisions in which a short-term shareholder
would vote, rather than sell or abstain, and where the shortterm gain comes at the expense of the corporation over time.
This Part will survey various ways in which ownership has
separated from ownership in modern investing. This separation
has deep ramifications for this Article’s central thesis: shareholder empowerment cannot solve the problem of managerial
myopia if it is only the short-term intermediary (e.g., the mutual fund, the hedge fund, or the pension fund) that is empowered, and not the ultimate holder, who is investing for the long
term. This Part concludes with the ultimate separation of ownership from ownership: “empty voting,” where the power to vote
has been stripped of any connection to economic interest.33

29. Strine, Excessive Risk-Taking, supra note 26.
30. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
285 (1998) (citing Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 591 (1992)).
31. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 5, at 1745.
32. Smith, supra note 30, at 285–86.
33. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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A. MUTUAL FUNDS
Mutual funds control a significant portion of the modernday market. In 2004, mutual funds held $4.49 trillion in assets,
or about twenty-four percent of total U.S. stock market capitalization.34 In 2006, mutual funds held thirty-two percent of U.S.
equities.35 And by year-end 2009, the U.S. mutual fund industry had grown to manage $11.1 trillion in assets, making the
U.S. mutual fund market the largest in the world.36 These
funds are the savings vehicles of choice for most Americans,
who seek a diversified investment that will fund retirement
and other long-term needs—investments with decades-long
time horizons.37 Such investors can choose between actively
managed funds or the increasingly popular index funds,38
which track a particular stock index such as the S&P 500. Each
type of fund poses separate problems for reformers seeking to
use shareholder empowerment as a way to control vertical
agency costs.
Actively managed mutual funds attempt to beat the market by investing in stocks that appreciate faster than average.
One might think that because active mutual fund managers bet
on particular companies, they would monitor management and
34. Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New
Evidence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 159–60 (2006).
35. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question
We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 n.31
(2010) [hereinafter Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question] (citing Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82
S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 655 (2009)).
36. INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 21–22 (50th ed.
2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2010_factbook.pdf. The U.S. mutual
fund market constitutes forty-eight percent of the world’s $23 trillion mutual
fund market. Id. at 22.
37. Strine, Excessive Risk-Taking, supra note 26.
38. See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., supra note 36, at 32 (“Index mutual funds
continued to remain popular with investors. . . . As of year-end 2009, 359 index
funds managed total net assets of $837 billion.”); Ben Baden, Why Investors
Are Flocking to Index Funds, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 16, 2010, http://
money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/investing/articles/2010/03/16/why
-investors-are-flocking-to-index-funds (“Lately, investors have voted with their
feet and chosen indexing over actively managed funds. Huge losses in the
stock market in 2008 prompted many investors to sell actively managed stock
funds. During that year, investors withdrew more than $214 billion from actively managed stock funds, while stock index funds saw inflows of more than
$47 billion, according to Morningstar. The trend continued in 2009, with investors withdrawing more than $37 billion from actively managed stock funds
and about $36 billion flowing into stock index funds.”).
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clamorously voice concerns about the companies within their
portfolios. In truth, active funds are short-term investors,
“turning over 100% or more of their portfolios each year.”39 Additionally, they hold stock in myriad companies and therefore
lack the incentive to expend research costs in determining
which votes in which particular companies would most increase
value.40 In addition, investments in mutual funds are highly
liquid, meaning that a mutual fund investor discontented with
a fund’s performance can withdraw her money at any time.41
Mutual fund managers thus feel intense pressure to maximize
short-term returns in order to attract and retain investors.42
Fund manager compensation is tied to outperforming a particular index in a year- or quarter-long period,43 and deviations
from that index are slight.44
Index funds offer a low-cost alternative to actively managed funds, which generally do not beat the market despite
charging hefty management fees.45 Index funds offer the nearautomation of investing, purporting to do no more than mimic

39. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 5, at 1290.
40. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst eds., The Harvard Law School Proxy
Access Roundtable 31 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., &
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 661, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539027.
41. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 36, at 193 (“By law, investors are able
to redeem mutual fund shares each business day. As a result, fund shares are
very liquid investments.”).
42. Anabtawi, supra note 5, at 580; Simon C.Y. Wong, Why Stewardship
Is Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors, 25 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L
BANKING & FIN. LAW 406, 406 (2010).
43. Fisch, supra note 27, at 882–83.
44. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 40, at 39. Roundtable participant Robert
Mendelsohn recounts a telling conversation with a mutual fund manager that
reveals how, perversely, fund managers can actually prefer a particular portfolio company to fare poorly. Id. Mendelsohn’s firm constituted one percent of
the relevant index, and the fund manager, pessimistic about Mendelsohn’s
company, owned 0.75 percent instead of one percent. Id. His chief mutual fund
competitor was bullish on the stock and owned 1.25 percent. Id. “This guy was
very candid. He said ‘I’m rooting against you, I hope your shares go down.’ I
said that’s not good for your shareholders. And he said, ‘well, I’m in the business of competing for assets under management with Company X. And if your
shares go down, it’s going to hurt Company X a lot more than it’s going to hurt
me. And that helps my business.’ Very honest. Now is that actually the kind of
behavior we want from the people we give our pension money to?” Id.
45. William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 83 (“Time and
time again, studies demonstrate that passive funds consistently outperform
active funds in the long run.”).
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the return of a particular stock index.46 The managers of index
funds thus have even less incentive to monitor the elections of
the companies whose shares their funds hold or to use their
votes to express displeasure with management. The whole
point of such funds is to minimize management fees by avoiding the introduction of human evaluation in the selection of
portfolio companies. The lack of human evaluation, in turn, effectively ensures the lack of any monitoring of managerial performance.
One might argue that index fund managers have an increased incentive to engage in shareholder activism, since they
are locked into a set of portfolio companies. Two problems make
activism less likely for index funds. First, the cost of free riding
would be huge. Take an S&P 500 index fund manager who lobbies for beneficial corporate governance changes at a portfolio
company. Any upside gained from the increase would be automatically shared equally with every other S&P 500 index fund
and exchange-traded fund (ETF), despite the lack of any effort
on the part of these competitor funds. Couple this with the
second fact that index funds market themselves largely on their
low fees and fidelity to the underlying index, and there is little
incentive for an index fund manager to engage in activism of
any kind.47
B. HEDGE FUNDS
Hedge funds are nonpublic entities exempt from regulation
under the Investment Company Act of 1940.48 They invest for
the short term, sometimes turning over an entire portfolio
three times a year.49 Although smaller players than mutual
funds,50 hedge funds control a significant portion of the market.
46. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 658 (1995) (noting the strategy of index funds to purchase stock of a certain index).
47. Wong, supra note 42, at 409.
48. See STAFF, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH
OF HEDGE FUNDS 3 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
hedgefunds0903.pdf (defining the term “hedge fund”). The fund must limit its
number of owners to 100 persons, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006), or have an unlimited number of individual investors that have at least $5 million net of debt
in investments exclusive of the hedge fund in question. See id. § 80a-3(c)(7).
49. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 5, at 1290–91.
50. See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 902 (8th ed. 2009) (“While mutual
funds are still the dominant form of investing in securities markets for most
individuals, hedge funds have enjoyed far greater growth rates in the last decade . . . .”).
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As of June 2009 more than 8900 hedge funds held over $1.43
trillion in assets.51
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock call hedge funds the “archetypal” short-term investment vehicle, observing that, “[f]or
some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a ‘longterm’ investment.”52 One class of hedge funds involves “activist”
or “event driven” investors.53 These investment managers seek
short-term payoffs such as dividend declarations, recapitalizations, sales of assets, and other actions that generate an immediate payoff.54 These activist funds are the ones most likely to
participate in say-on-pay or shareholder access proposals because they invest in order to accomplish a specific goal.55
Hedge fund structures are, in short, shaped by a desire for
a quick return. The lifespan of any particular hedge fund is typically short, and therefore hedge fund managers must return to
capital markets often in search of fresh assets in which to invest.56 Such a temporary focus might encourage a hedge fund to
force a company to take actions such as selling a division or
declaring a dividend—actions that generate a quick payout but
harm the long-term health of the company.57
Short-termist criticism can, it is true, be overstated. Activism focused on the short term is not necessarily a bad thing.58
Long-term and short-term interests can be aligned in disciplining managers, forcing them to shed ill-advised acquisitions or
51. COAL. OF PRIVATE INV. COS., HEDGE FUNDS: HOW THEY SERVE
INVESTORS IN U.S. AND GLOBAL MARKETS 3 (2009), available at http://www
.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Hedge_Funds.pdf. Hedge
fund assets were even higher in 2008, totaling $1.9 trillion. BODIE ET AL., supra note 50, at 902.
52. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007).
53. This class is opposed to corporate-governance focused activist investors. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35, at 8
n.20 (citing Charles Nathan & Parul Mehta, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investors and Institutional Voting, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. n.1 (Apr. 6, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard
.edu/corpgov/2010/04/06/the-parallel-universes-of-institutional-investing-and
-institutional-voting).
54. Id.
55. There are, however, anecdotal signs of unwillingness to do so. See
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 40, at 25 (“[A]t a recent meeting of shareholders
in hedge funds, the question was asked, how many in that room would use
access? Not a single hedge fund raised his or her hand.”).
56. Anabtawi, supra note 5, at 580.
57. Id. at 581.
58. Kahan & Rock, supra note 52, at 1084.
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to return excess cash to investors.59 The partnership-based governance structure of hedge funds—which fosters close ties between firm and investor well-being, management by investors,
and encouragement of distribution—may make these entities
less subject to agency costs.60 Even so, some hedge fund decisions inevitably will focus on the short term at the expense of
the long term, if we assume that market price does not equate
to long-term firm value.61
Kahan and Rock argue these concerns are overblown because hedge funds can only affect corporate policy by gaining
the broad support of “corporate management, independent directors, traditional institutional investors with large stakes,
and other large shareholders.”62 Yet we have already seen that
mutual funds, the biggest institutional investors, invest for the
short term.63 Corporate management hardly provides a corrective to investor myopia.64 As Kahan and Rock themselves acknowledge, managers naturally bias toward the short term:
chief executive officer (CEO) turnover is high, and many highlevel executives are close to retirement.65 Management’s natural desire to produce short-term returns feeds on and is reinforced by hedge funds’ desire to make a quick buck.66 Hedge
fund activism, then, may sometimes cut down on vertical agency costs, but it does so by increasing horizontal conflicts, most
notably with longer-term shareholders.
C. LABOR UNIONS AND PENSION FUNDS
Funds such as CalPers, CalSTERS, and the AFL-CIO
strike terror into the hearts of firm managers. Such funds often
agitate for reform on corporate governance matters, such as the
elimination of classified boards and poison pills, majority voting, and proxy access.67 Labor unions and pension funds, more
than any other intermediary investor, have the time and motivation to monitor the long-term health of companies in which
59. See id. at 1088–89.
60. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 289, 290–93 (2009).
61. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 703.
62. Kahan and Rock, supra note 52, at 1089.
63. Id. at 1083.
64. Id. at 1088.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1088–89.
67. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35,
at 8 n.20.
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they invest. Proudly carrying the mantle of true corporate governance activists, they are concerned with fundamental changes in corporate decisionmaking rather than the quick payouts
that concern event-driven activists.68
There is, however, a fly in the ointment. The difficulty is
that labor unions and pension funds may well have interests
that have no relation to the financial health of the company—
whether short-term or long-term—such as favoring laborfriendly policies or seeking publicity for causes (e.g., domestic
job creation over offshoring) that serve the ends of their own
fund participants rather than the good of the company as a
whole.69 For example, the pension fund for the Safeway workers’ union used its position as shareholder to try to remove the
Safeway CEO after he failed to meet union demands in collective bargaining negotiations.70 This series of events illustrates
how a horizontal conflict can result from the divergence of the
interests of a particular investor from the concerns of investors
in the aggregate regardless of a difference in time horizons.71 It
is true that these investors will need to market their initiatives
to appeal to the broader shareholder electorate, but if that electorate is largely passive, coalition building has less of a chance
to temper the idiosyncrasies of labor unions and pension funds.
As we will see in Part II.A.2, if reform empowers investors
who are largely focused on the short term, two different problems can result based on whether short-term shareholders do
or do not exercise their newfound voice. If they do not, the risk
is that short-termist silence will accord disproportionate power
to the idiosyncratically motivated long-term shareholders. If
short-termists do rouse from their apathy and exercise their

68. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to
Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 48–49 (1998).
69. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 5, at 1754 –55 (“[U]nion and public employee pension funds,
which generally have been the most active institutions with respect to corporate
governance issues[,] . . . are precisely the institutions most likely to use their
position to self-deal—that is, to . . . reap private benefits not shared with other
investors. . . . Public employee pension funds are especially vulnerable to being
used as a vehicle for advancing political or social goals unrelated to shareholder
interests.”); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND.
L.J. 1259, 1271 (2009) (describing the tendency of public pension funds and other “social investors” to use shareholder power to advance idiosyncratic agendas).
70. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 5, at 1755 n.100 (citing Anabtawi, supra note 5, at 34).
71. Id. at 1745.
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vote, the firm’s policies presumably will tilt even more toward
the short term.
D. EMPTY VOTING
The phenomenon of empty voting provides the starkest example of the problems that stem from relying on unfettered
shareholder action to protect long-term shareholder interest.72
Henry Hu and Bernard Black have identified situations in
which investors have decoupled voting rights from economic interests.73 These cases demonstrate that, at least in extreme
cases, relying on the shareholder franchise to protect any
shareholder economic interests—including long-term interests—can be foolhardy.74
In one example of empty voting, Perry Corp., a hedge fund,
owned a significant stake in King Pharmaceuticals.75 Mylan
Laboratories agreed to buy King at a substantial premium to
its then-current trading price.76 Mylan’s shares dropped when
the deal was announced, and the company needed shareholder
approval in order for the deal to go through.77 Perry then
bought 9.9 percent of Mylan, becoming Mylan’s largest shareholder, in order to help assure a positive shareholder vote and
completion of the deal.78 But Perry at the same time fully
hedged any economic risk associated with its Mylan ownership,
so that it was protected even if the firm lost value.79 It therefore both held 9.9 percent voting ownership in Mylan and had
no economic interest in Mylan. Perry thus could vote its Mylan
72. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61
BUS. LAW. 1011 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Empty Voting I ]; Henry T.C.
Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008) [hereinafter Hu &
Black, Empty Voting II ]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007) [hereinafter
Hu & Black, Hedge Funds]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote
Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV.
811 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying].
73. Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 72, at 629.
74. Hu & Black, Empty Voting I, supra note 72, at 1056; Hu & Black,
Empty Voting II, supra note 72, at 655–58; Hu & Black, Hedge Funds, supra
note 72, at 345–53; Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 854 –57.
75. Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 816.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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shares unreservedly for the acquisition, even if Mylan was
about to pay too high a price for King. Perry would profit from
an inflated price because of its investment in King, yet remain
shielded from any counterbalancing loss because of its investment in Mylan.80 Hu and Black refer to this type of voting divorced from economic interest as “empty voting.”81
Some critics have questioned whether empty voting is the
problem Hu and Black see it to be.82 The authors defend the
importance of the phenomenon by observing that the number of
decoupling examples has grown from twenty-one in 2006 to
over eighty in 2008 in more than twenty countries.83 To be sure,
this remains a small number of cases. Even if empty voting is
only an isolated phenomenon, however, it reveals the clearest
imaginable case of horizontal conflict, casting in sharp relief
the danger of relying on the shareholder vote to empower
shareholders and discipline managers.84 In some cases, a vote
holder may have no economic interest in the firm at all.
Not all commentators view empty voting as pernicious;
Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein argue the benefits of empty voting—which they term “outsider trading”—on the ground
that it encourages traders to generate and trade on socially
productive information.85 As long as this information is not obtained by fraud or misappropriation, it should be rewarded.86
But even if empty voting is beneficial to the market overall, it
nonetheless illustrates the problems of relying on the shareholder franchise for the protection of shareholder interests.87
This Part has elucidated a disconnect between the shortterm interests of intermediary corporate shareholders such as
mutual funds and hedge funds, and the interests of long-term
investors in these intermediaries. Even when time horizons
80. Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 816.
81. Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 72, at 629; Hu & Black, The
New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 816.
82. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and
the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 112 (2010) (“Despite the scholarly jeremiads over empty voting, it has never yet altered the
result of a shareholder vote, and problems from it are likely to remain rare or
nonexistent.”).
83. Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 72, at 630.
84. Id. at 701.
85. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 67 (2006).
86. Id.
87. See generally Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 72; Hu &
Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 816.
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converge, as in the case of pension funds and labor unions, the
potential for horizontal conflict arises because of particular
causes such funds are interested in advancing.88 Empty voting
illustrates in the clearest way the risk of horizontal conflict
costs by showing that the shareholder franchise does not always represent the interests of other shareholders, let alone
the firm as a whole.89 It is not necessary, of course, that each
type of shareholder have a long-term focus in order for the
market to function effectively, as long as the overall governance
system balances competing interests.90 The question is whether
a regulatory regime strikes the right balance. Part II will consider regulatory responses to the financial crisis, demonstrating the problems posed by undue reliance on shareholder empowerment as a cure for managerial short-termism and the
systemic risk such reliance has engendered.
II. THE THEORIES BEHIND THE REGULATORY
RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Shortly after the financial crisis, Congress enacted the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA),91 which
created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)92 to provide
funds for failing companies. The next year it enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which
imposed rules and restrictions on recipients of TARP funds.93
More recently, in July 2010, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank,
which imposes new corporate governance rules on all publicly
traded companies.94 As we will see, many themes from the bailout regulation reemerge in Dodd-Frank, and these themes focus on shareholder empowerment.
The evolution from atomistic shareholding to concentrated
institutional ownership discussed in Part I raises significant
questions about the efficacy of the standard shareholder activism toolkit as a response to the financial crisis. This Part will
focus on the shareholder-empowerment regulatory strategy and
88. Smith, supra note 30, at 285.
89. Anabtawi, supra note 5, at 580.
90. Kahan & Rock, supra note 52, at 1088–89.
91. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
92. Id. §§ 101–136.
93. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115.
94. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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its failure to deal with the problem posed by the modern separation of institutional ownership from beneficial ownership of
corporate shares.
A. ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST SHORT-TERMISM
The corporate governance reforms of both the bailout legislation and Dodd-Frank are concerned with self-interested managerial short-termism, particularly with regard to executive
compensation. Major corporate governance provisions of the
bailout focused on executive compensation, due to a widespread
perception that managers were concerned with short-term financial results and failed to consider the long-term effects of
their actions.95 Under key provisions of the bailout legislation,
for example, the senior executives of TARP recipients96 could
not receive compensation that created incentives for those officers to take “unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the
value” of the firm.97 The law further prohibited any compensation plan that encouraged the manipulation of reported earnings.98 A clawback provision required that bonuses paid to the
twenty-five most highly compensated employees be recoverable
if based on “materially inaccurate” financial statements or performance-metric criteria.99 The concern of these clawbacks is
that short-term managers can manipulate earnings or results,
reap a large payout, and then lose nothing when the company
suffers in the long term as a result of their actions. Recipients’
compensation committees were also required to undertake reviews of compensation plans to guard against short-termism.100
Dodd-Frank also requires assessments of excessive risk
fostering in compensation:
Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this title, the
appropriate Federal regulators shall jointly prescribe regulations or
guidelines that prohibit any types of incentive-based payment ar95. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation:
Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 360 (2009).
96. Defined as one of the top five most highly paid executives. American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include § 111(a)(1)).
97. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include
§ 111(b)(3)(A)).
98. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include
§ 111(b)(3)(E)).
99. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include
§ 111(b)(3)(B)).
100. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include
§ 111(e)(1)).
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rangement . . . that the regulators determine encourages inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions—(1) by providing . . . excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or (2) that could lead to material financial loss . . . .101

Comparable clawbacks on bonuses also appear in DoddFrank.102 The tenor of these provisions, especially when taken
as a whole, is that managers are in it for the short term. Thus,
we need to shift incentives to discourage schemes that encourage excessive risk.
Aside from these prescriptive remedies, other reforms—
regarding say-on-pay, proxy access, and disclosure—focused on
bringing heightened accountability to the board by way of empowering shareholders.103 These provisions embrace the BerleMeans narrative of separated ownership and control.104 The
goal of both proxy access and say-on-pay is to give a new voice
to these disenfranchised shareholders with the hope that they
will make boards and managers more accountable for their decisions.105 Indeed, the Dodd-Frank subtitle dealing with executive compensation is called “Accountability and Executive
Compensation.”106
To be clear, accountability and a need for a more long-term
perspective from managers are not synonymous. The desire for
a say-on-pay and for proxy access are more about giving shareholders power to voice concerns over managerial overreaching
than addressing particular concerns related to shorttermism.107 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
explicitly draws a line between accountability and the shareholder franchise: “A principal way that shareholders can hold
boards accountable . . . is through the nomination and election
of directors.”108 But a central presumption of the reform tactic
of giving shareholders more voice to make managers more accountable is that shareholders are motivated to use their voice
101. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956(b) 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010).
102. Id. § 954.
103. Bruner, supra note 25, at 318.
104. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 19, at 112–16.
105. See Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy
Access, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 17), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1537211.
106. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 951–957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–907 (2010).
107. See McDonnell, supra note 105, at 17 (“The leading broad value favoring proxy access is accountability.”).
108. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,669 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
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to further the long-term health of the corporation.109 As Part I
showed, this presumption may not hold. We now turn to an examination of specific corporate governance provisions to examine how shareholder myopia creates problems for specific
corporate governance reforms of the bailout.
1. Say-on-Pay
Concern about oversize CEO pay packages and option
plans has increased in recent decades,110 and the optionsbackdating scandal of 2006111 heightened concerns that executives were lining their pockets at the expense of shareholders.112 Not surprisingly, recent legal reforms have focused on
shareholder control of executive compensation. Giving the
shareholders a say on executive pay at least allows investors
some input on the payment of managers.
ARRA imposed a say-on-pay requirement on TARP recipients,113 a regulatory measure that quickly affected corporate
governance more broadly. On January 12, 2010, the SEC
adopted Rule 14a-20, which requires a shareholder say-on-pay
vote at any “annual (or special meeting in lieu of the annual)
meeting of security holders” for all publicly held corporations.114 Following the lead of the ARRA, the say-on-pay vote is
not binding on the board of directors, but merely advisory.115
Executive compensation also took center stage in Dodd-Frank.
The Act requires companies to conduct both say-on-pay116 and
say-on-golden-parachute votes, although again these votes are
nonbinding.117
Say-on-pay provisions rely on shareholders processing and
evaluating CEO pay and casting an informed vote on whether
109. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35,
at 8–9.
110. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
61–79 (2004).
111. See generally Jesse M. Fried, Options Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (2008).
112. Id. at 880.
113. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111, 122 Stat. 3765, 3776–77, to include § 111(e)).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-20 (2010).
115. Id.
116. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–905 (2010).
117. Id.
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the pay package is good or bad.118 Dodd-Frank in particular
makes the populist move of requiring public companies to disclose the ratio of CEO pay to median employee pay.119 But in
light of the current investment landscape, reliance on shareholders to check managerial greed is all but incoherent.120
Hedge funds, mutual funds, and empty voters are unlikely to
pay much attention to CEO compensation.121 While the manner
of compensation and the incentives it creates might be of concern, an up-or-down, after-the-fact vote on an overall compensation plan does not address these worries. Because even an
outsized pay package represents only a small portion of a public
corporation’s expenses, executive compensation poses little
cause for concern to a strategic investor like a hedge fund.122
Mutual funds lack the motivation to vote at all, let alone in a
principled way, given the relatively small position any one
company represents in their portfolio and the funds’ high rates
of churn.123 The votes that an empty voter is buying are not
nonbinding votes on executive compensation, but rather votes
on acquisitions, dividends, and the like.124 In terms of institutional investors, then, we are left with pension funds and labor
unions. Even these managers, however, may not vote against
executive pay packages to foster long-term corporate value.125
Instead, they are more likely to voice opposition to curry favor
with constituents or to express a political view.126
In short, relying on say-on-pay votes to create useful correctives to high short-term executive compensation schemes—
and the threat to long-term corporate well-being that such
schemes entail—seems ill-conceived. Some short-term-focused
investors will not care about the issue at all. Others will prefer
118. Id. §§ 953, 955.
119. Id. § 953.
120. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35,
at 21 n.67.
121. Thomas & Martin, supra note 68, at 68.
122. Cf. Richard A. Booth, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance,
and the Partner-Manager, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 281 (discussing the relationship between management pay and company income); Frank Partnoy &
Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation 38
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper, No. 06-21, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=931254 (discussing hedge fund trading strategies).
123. See supra Part I.A.
124. See supra Part I.D.
125. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 5, at 1754.
126. See supra Part I.C.
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compensation schemes that reward a managerial short-term focus that mirrors their own. Finally, pension and union funds
may vote, but not necessarily with an eye to the best interests
of the firm. Shareholder empowerment as to say-on-pay thus
provides little, if any, safeguarding of long-term corporate interests.
2. Proxy Access
Proxy access advocates have long criticized the uncontested
nature of the typical annual director election, in which the
company proposes a slate and shareholders then vote for the
management-designated directors—or, as most do, simply toss
the ballots in the trash can.127 While insurgents have always
been able to launch proxy contests, waging these battles is costly for the protesting shareholders, so that they are seldom undertaken except in the context of takeovers.128 Outside of a hostile takeover (by necessity, the preserve only of extremely
wealthy shareholders), the most voice a discontented shareholder can muster is purposefully not voting, or withholding
her vote for the management slate, as a sign of displeasure.
The idea of proxy access is to give large shareholders a chance
to nominate their own candidates, creating a contested election
that gives all shareholders a meaningful choice at the corporate
ballot box.129
While Dodd-Frank does not require the SEC to promulgate
proxy access rules, it affirms its power to do so.130 Acting pursuant to this grant of authority, the SEC duly issued a final
rule that at last made proxy access a reality on August 25,
127. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1264 –67.
128. Id. at 1265.
129. Id. at 1267–68.
130. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010). Dodd-Frank also requires national securities exchanges to prohibit broker discretionary voting, unless the
stock’s beneficial owner specifically instructs the broker to vote, a measure
that will remove many desultory votes for management’s slate. § 957. The
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) had earlier eliminated broker discretionary
voting this proxy voting season. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule
Change Relating to Broker Discretionary Voting, SEC Release No. 60215 (July
1, 2009) [hereinafter SEC Rule 452 Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro/nyse/2009/34 -60215.pdf. Discretionary voting enables brokers to vote
on behalf of the ultimate shareholders, without receiving specific instructions
from them. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1292. Interestingly, uncontested elections of companies regulated under the Investment Company Act are exempt,
an important fact given the power of institutional investors like mutual funds
and pension funds. SEC Rule 452 Release, supra.
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2010.131 A nominating shareholder or shareholder group must
fulfill certain requirements to be able to put forward an alternative director or directors.132 In particular, it must: (1) own at
least three percent of the company’s securities entitled to be
voted at the meeting, (2) have owned these securities continuously for at least three years, and (3) maintain this ownership
through the meeting date.133 The nominator cannot hold the securities with an intent to gain control of the firm or have an
agreement with the company regarding the nomination.134 The
SEC rule, however, has not yet taken effect. Rather, the SEC
has stayed its operation pending resolution of a suit filed by the
Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce.135
The logic of proxy access presumes that the corporation as
a whole will benefit if shareholders have a choice among potential directors, including nominees that come from shareholders
who are disconnected from corporate managers.136 Proxy access
critics voice two main fears. First, the firm will suffer the illeffects of short-term-focused investors if the board is no longer
insulated from proxy challenge.137 Second, shareholder nominees will be special-interest candidates, focused on idiosyncratic agendas rather than the overall good of the corporation.138
The SEC took steps to address the first concern by imposing a
holding period of three years on would-be director nomina-

131. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
132. Id. at 56,689.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 2010), 2010 WL 5116461.
136. Brief for Respondent at 25–26, Bus. Roundtable, No. 10-1305 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 19, 2011), 2011 WL 496545.
137. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rule:
Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 379 (2010) (“[P]roxy
access generates ‘megaphone externalities’ that are exceptionally valuable to
labor unions and public pension funds. These megaphone externalities describe the additional publicity that accrues, at very little cost, to shareholder
groups that run their own board nominees advocating a particular cause.”).
However, as Lisa Fairfax points out, proxy access might actually decrease the
power of special interest groups by broadening access to include more shareholders. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1272.
138. Proxy access advocates such as Lisa Fairfax and Brett McDonnell
counter that candidates still need to obtain the majority of the shareholder
vote, which offers protection against the special interest danger. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1272; McDonnell, supra note 107, at 19.
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tors.139 This requirement, however, provides only a partial solution to the problem of shareholder short-termism. The difficulty
is that the holding-period requirement only ensures that director nominators will be (relatively) long-term investors.140 Investors, however, now wear two hats—as both nominators and
voters—and solving the short-term nominator problem does not
address the short-term voter problem.141
A key question thus presents itself: Who will vote in the
greater number of contested board elections likely to result
from the SEC’s new proxy access rules? Empty voters, hedge
funds, and pension funds could all vote, and their votes would
count all the more in light of the elimination of broker discretionary voting.142 The new proxy access rules, however, forbid
shareholders from nominating candidates if their intent is to
gain control over the corporation, which will make hedge funds
and empty voters less likely to nominate directors or participate in the process.143 Mutual fund managers are also unlikely
to participate because of the diversity of their portfolios and
their short-term focus;144 it is simply a waste of effort for managers to expend energy on researching director candidates because they will likely not hold a corporation’s stock for more
than a year.145 Because only long-term shareholders are eligible
139. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,674 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
140. See id. For purposes of this discussion I will take as a given that three
years constitutes a long-term investment horizon. As we have seen, in the current investing climate, it certainly does.
141. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1263.
142. Under the former model, uncontested director elections were considered “routine,” and brokers could vote shares for management candidates
without voting instructions from shareholders. Fairfax, supra note 69, at
1292–93. Under the new NYSE rules, and Dodd-Frank, brokers will no longer
be able to vote for management candidates without specific instructions from
shareholders. Id. at 1292; see supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
143. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,675.
144. See, e.g., Lilian Ng et al., Do Mutual Funds Vote Responsibly? Evidence from Proxy Voting 5 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Orlando/Papers/MFVoting_Jan07.pdf (“[C]orporate
governance experts have long questioned often conflicted voting of mutual
funds and their failure to be vocal in cases of gross corporate mismanagement.
Some mutual funds are suspected of not casting their votes, others are assumed to blindly vote with management . . . . Moreover, mutual funds have
historically been considered less involved in governance, compared with other
institutions, especially pension funds. Their frequent trading due to short investment horizons, as contrasted with pension funds, has been considered part
of the reason.”).
145. Id.
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to nominate directors, presumably few short-termist candidates
will make it to the corporate ballot.146 In short, proxy access offers a choice to shareholders that many may be rationally uninterested in choosing.
The rational apathy of mutual funds and hedge funds in
director elections magnifies the second concern—the idiosyncratic shareholder.147 The three percent holding requirement
seeks to ensure substantial commitment to the firm by nominators, and proxy-access defenders can argue that any shareholder-nominee still requires the buy-in of other shareholders in order to succeed.148 However, combine the rational apathy
problem with the elimination of broker discretionary voting,
and labor unions and pension funds may well have a disproportionately large voice in any corporate vote.149
Proxy access, then, gives long-term shareholders a voice in
ballot composition, but does not address the question of who
will vote. Two problems arise from this state of affairs. First,
many intermediaries may not vote at all.150 Second, those who
do vote may well be the most idiosyncratic of shareholders.151
In sum, proxy access as currently implemented is unlikely to
address the short-termist problem at all.
B. EMPOWERING SHORT-TERM SHAREHOLDERS WILL NOT MAKE
CORPORATIONS FOCUS ON THE LONG TERM
The corporate governance reforms in both the bailout legislation and Dodd-Frank are fundamentally concerned with companies’ short-term focus. Yet the solutions they offer rely on
empowering shareholders who, as we have seen, are themselves predominantly focused on the short term. The reforms
are thus unlikely to achieve their goal.
Before turning to this central thesis, two related arguments—the first in opposition to the bailout reforms themselves and the second in opposition to the central thesis of this
Article—must be acknowledged and addressed. The first is that
the bailout reforms are ill-advised because they seek to maximize the long-term wealth of a corporation; according to some
critics, any shareholder-focused agency model should encourage
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1268.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1270–71.
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management to maximize the corporation’s short-term stock
price.152 This view, however, is in tension with several principles of corporate law.153 The shareholder-wealth-maximization norm gives managers a great deal of leeway in how they go
about their maximizing, and the pursuit of short-term price appreciation is clearly not required.154 It is true, as Jeffrey Gordon has pointed out, that short-term stock prices are more reliable today than in the past as a measure of management’s
performance.155 But that observation is largely beside the point.
There is ample room in the shareholder-wealth-maximization
norm to privilege long-term over short-term wealth maximization, as the governmental response to the bailout seeks to do.
The second argument opposes this Article’s suggestion that
empowering short-termist investors will not protect a corporation’s long-term interests. On this view, because present market price merely reflects long-term value, there is no problem.156 In other words, even short-term investors have
incentives to maximize long-term value, so that both groups’
incentives are aligned.157 Long-term projects, however, may require expensive investments that are difficult for the market to
process.158 Both firm and fund managers have historically been
compensated based on quarterly numbers, which encourages
short-termism, earnings management,159 and, in the worst cases, outright fraud.160 As William Bratton and Michael Wachter
argue, “maximizing the corporation’s fundamental value and
maximizing its stock price can amount to distinct objectives in
the presence of information asymmetries.”161 Inevitably, such
asymmetries exist between managers and public investors.162
152. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 711–12.
153. Id. at 658–59.
154. Id. at 711–12.
155. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1465, 1541 (2007).
156. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 668.
157. Id.; Dent, supra note 82, at 122–23.
158. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 700–01.
159. See id. at 702.
160. David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly
Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890,
892–97 (2002) (discussing quarterly earnings pressures and instances of fraud
at Enron, WorldCom, and others).
161. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 703.
162. See id. at 697. The author acknowledges that market myopia can be
used as an excuse to shield poor managers from criticism. See Kahan & Rock,
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What is most problematic for the bailout reforms is that
shareholders with a predominantly short-term focus probably
want managers to opt for a similarly short-term focus.163 Both
groups want to maximize corporate earnings in terms measured in days, months, or quarters, rather than in years. Thus,
for example, relying on the shareholders’ say-on-pay vote does
not achieve the goal of ensuring that pay is in any sense fair or
in keeping with the long-term interests of the corporation.164
Similarly, compensation structures that encourage short-term
gains at the cost of long-term risk might actually be attractive
to a shareholder looking for a quick payday and early exit from
her investment.
This is not to say that efforts to render managers accountable to shareholders are inevitably futile. The point instead is
that empowering shareholders—because of their predominantly
short-term outlook—is not well calculated to achieve the ends
financial reform appears to have intended, particularly the end
of reducing larger systemic risks that arise from corporate
managers’ short-term focus.165
The question, then, is where to go from here. Shareholder
advocates argue that the need for some check on vertical agency costs—in the form of heightened managerial accountability—remains.166 As Brett McDonnell succinctly puts it, “The political deck is stacked in favor of managers and boards and
against shareholders . . . .”167 He rightly observes that corporate managers and boards are better able to organize politically
and that states cater to them because managers choose the
place of incorporation.168 This Article does not deny the existence of these forces and resulting vertical agency costs; it merely questions whether shareholder empowerment as currently
conceived offers a coherent solution.
Advocates of the status quo manager-shareholder balance
counter that capital markets—particularly the market for corporate control—provide needed correctives to managerial oversupra note 52, at 1085 n.271 (collecting finance literature on the market’s alleged short-termism).
163. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 711.
164. Id. at 710–11.
165. Id. at 711.
166. Id. at 655.
167. Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment:
A Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 139, 188 (2009).
168. Id.

2011] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP

1849

reaching.169 According to Stephen Bainbridge, for example,
some agency costs will inevitably exist,170 but critics have
greatly overemphasized their extent and seriousness.171 There
are, however, significant problems with this view. To begin
with, saying that agency costs are overemphasized is not saying
that these costs do not exist. And, in any event, the logic of the
bailout regulation is that managerial short-termism has
created systemic risk by imposing negative externalities on the
larger economy.172 On this view, market mechanisms cannot
solve the problem; if anything, they may exacerbate it by driving managers to ever-more-risky decisions that increase shareholder welfare in the immediate term at the expense of the
long-term.173 Taking this concern seriously, Part III will canvass remaining regulatory mechanisms designed to focus managers on the longer-term interests of their firms.
III. OTHER POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO MANAGERIAL
SHORT-TERMISM
As the last Part has shown, giving greater voice to myopic
shareholders will not solve the problem of managerial shorttermism. Shareholder empowerment simply pushes agency
costs down a level, creating horizontal conflicts as shareholder
groups privilege idiosyncratic interests and differing time horizons.174 This section surveys potential solutions to the problem
of suboptimal managerial short-termism apart from shareholder empowerment.

169. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 669; Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors, supra note 5, at 7.
170. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 5, at 1747.
171. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity:
Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 231, 232 (2008) (“[M]odern corporate governance scholarship has focused on finding a means to bridge the agency gap between diversified risk
bearers and managers.”); Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional
Investors, supra note 5, at 7.
172. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 659.
173. See Fisch, supra note 27, at 882 (“Indeed, the objectives of the diversified institutional shareholder do not provide meaningful limitations on managerial risk-taking and may cause managers to take excessive risk in an effort
to boost share price.”).
174. See supra Part I.C.
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A. DISCLOSURE
Disclosure is the hallmark reform in the American system:
Brandeis’s sunshine175 works its magic because, when investors
have the relevant facts, the market is able to price stocks fairly,
at least according to a semistrong efficient capital markets hypothesis.176 Unlike say-on-pay and proxy access, disclosure does
not focus specifically on giving a voice to current shareholders.177 Instead, it is an accountability mechanism that ensures
that the overall market—including prospective investors—have
an accurate picture of the health of the organization.178 Aside
from shareholder empowerment, disclosure is the chief tactic
that financial reform legislation has embraced.179 As this section will show, although it is politically easy to impose a disclosure mandate, recent research questions whether disclosure
alone is enough to influence investor behavior.180 Furthermore,
disclosure of short-term incentives in executive compensation
may only attract investors already biased to the short term
themselves, thus undercutting the very purpose of requiring
disclosure in the first place.
The bailout legislation required less disclosure than DoddFrank, and in the case of private firms it needed only to be
made to the Treasury Department.181 However, in direct response to the AIG corporate retreat scandal, the ARRA did require disclosure of company-wide policies on excessive or luxury

175. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY—AND HOW THE
BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat’l Home Library Found. ed. 1914).
176. The classic explanation for the mechanism by which the market
processes information is set forth in Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 553 (1984).
177. See id. at 638 (arguing that members of the professional trading community benefit most from disclosure).
178. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A
Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis 3 (U.C.
Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1585953, 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585953 (noting that disclosure
was expected to allow investors to analyze credit risk).
179. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 176, at 635 (detailing the debate over
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
180. Bartlett, supra note 178, at 51 (showing how disclosure in a sector of
the market did not appear to change investor behavior).
181. See Katie Feuer, What Dodd-Frank Means for Public Companies,
INSIDE INVESTOR REL. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/
articles/16271/dodd-frank-means-public-companies/ (describing the additional
reporting requirements enacted in Dodd-Frank).
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expenditures.182 Public TARP recipients were required to disclose narrative descriptions of compensation plans,183 and to
provide explanations of how they did not encourage senior officers to take unnecessary and excessive risks.184 Recipients also had to explain how general employee compensation plans
limited unnecessary risks,185 and explain why these plans did
not encourage the manipulation of reported earnings.186
Dodd-Frank likewise requires disclosures on executive
compensation,187 the ratio of median compensation of employees to the CEO’s annual compensation,188 employee and director hedging,189 compensation structure,190 and the reasons
why the company has elected to combine or split the CEO and
chairman of the board positions.191
What could be wrong with legal mandates of this sort? Disclosure requirements are, after all, the easiest reform to implement because they refrain from imposing any substantive
mandate on corporations.192 One problem is that the semistrong efficient capital markets hypothesis argues that market
prices take account of all publicly available information.193
Subsequent research in behavioral finance, however, has challenged this model by questioning whether the market actually
182. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111(d), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777, such that “[t]he
board of directors of any TARP recipient shall have in place a companywide
policy regarding excessive or luxury expenditures,” including “entertainment
or events; office and facility renovations; aviation or other transportation services; or other activities or events that are not reasonable expenditures for staff
development, reasonable performance incentives, or other similar measures”).
183. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include
§ 111(b)(4)).
184. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include
§ 111(b)(3)(A)).
185. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include
§ 111(c)(2)).
186. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include
§ 111(b)(3)(B), (b)(4)).
187. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 953(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010).
188. Id. § 953(b)(1)(C).
189. Id. § 955.
190. Id. § 956.
191. Id. § 972.
192. Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
193. Lynn Stout, The Mechanics of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003).
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does accurately reflect all publicly available information.194 Recent literature has highlighted how even professional investors
can be distracted from processing relevant public information.195 The information’s salience appears to play a large role
in its ability to affect the market.196 For example, when the
scientific journal Nature published information on a potential
cancer breakthrough for pharmaceutical company EntreMed,
the stock appreciated significantly—by 28.4 percent.197 The information was concurrently reported in the New York Times
and in other mainstream media, but not in headline stories.198
Five months later, a front page New York Times article containing “virtually the same information” caused a second much
higher, and permanent, rise in the company’s stock price.199 In
short, “it seems that the no-new-news [front-page] Times article
caused the stock price to more than double, on a permanent basis.”200
A recent study by Robert Bartlett likewise casts doubt on
the market’s ability to process low-salience information.201
Bartlett examines the monoline insurance industry in 2008.202
Because of European regulatory requirements, investors had
information not only on some monoline insurers’ exposure to
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), but also on underlying
portfolio compositions and ratings downgrades for bonds included in them as significant investments.203 Bartlett found insurers’ stock prices virtually unaffected despite announcements
of downgrades in these important underlying securities.204
Even more interesting, a hedge fund that had been shorting
one of the insurers failed to account for the publicly available
information.205 A possible reason for this failure lies in the accessibility of the information. Even though the information was
publicly available, obtaining it would have meant analyzing
194. Id. at 651–59.
195. Id. at 659.
196. Id. at 655.
197. Gur Huberman & Tomer Regev, Contagious Speculation and a Cure
for Cancer: A Nonevent that Made Stock Prices Soar, 56 J. FIN. 387, 390 (2001).
198. The New York Times story, for example, was on page A28. Id.
199. Id. at 391.
200. Id. at 388.
201. Bartlett, supra note 178.
202. Id. at 4 –5.
203. Id. at 5.
204. Id. at 6.
205. Id. at 39.
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300- to 400-page prospectuses for each of 534 underlying CDOs,
a logistical challenge apparently too great even for highly motivated and sophisticated arbitrageurs.206 Bartlett’s work suggests that it is not the act of disclosure, but the visibility of disclosure—that is, its salience—that matters most.207 Investors,
including professionals, have only limited attention to devote to
processing information.
Despite this research, the regulators have continued to assume that more disclosure is better than less, while giving little
attention to the salience of required disclosures.208 In the most
extreme case, following corporate spending scandals,209 the
luxury expenditures section of ARRA required that the boards
of TARP recipients adopt
a companywide policy regarding excessive or luxury expenditures, as
identified by the Secretary, which may include excessive expenditures
on—(1) entertainment or events; (2) office and facility renovations; (3)
aviation or other transportation services; or (4) other activities or
events that are not reasonable expenditures for staff development,
reasonable performance incentives, or other similar measures conducted in the normal course of the business operations of the TARP
recipient.210

Treasury regulations permitted such disclosures via website.211 But website disclosure is of relatively low salience, and
therefore of little utility, to investors.212 In contrast to information made readily available to all in centralized SEC filings,
this information is contained on each individual company web-

206. Id. at 40–41.
207. Id. at 49.
208. Id. at 51.
209. E.g., Peter S. Green, Merrill’s Thain Said to Pay $1.2 Million to Decorator (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg
.com/apps/news?sid=aFcrG8er4FRw&pid=newsarchive (noting former Merrill
Lynch & Co. CEO John Thain’s reported $1.2 million office renovations in
January 2009); Ed Henry, Citi Says No to $45 Million Jet, CNNMONEY,
Jan. 27, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/27/news/companies/citigroup_jet/?
postversion=2009012716 (describing the Citigroup plane fiasco); Sean Lengell,
AIG Execs Hold $440K Post-Bailout Retreat, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/07/aig-execs-hold-440000-post
-bailout-retreat/?page=1 (reporting the over $440,000 AIG retreat in October
2008).
210. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111, 122 Stat. 3765, 3776–77).
211. 31 C.F.R. § 30.12 (2010).
212. Cf. Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 192, at 26 (describing the
problems with Internet disclosure in the context of ethics codes).
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site and thus must be looked up separately.213 The information
is also transitory in nature, and subject to modification at the
discretion of the company.214
Cynics will point out that luxury-expenditure disclosure
requirements were politically motivated and that no one actually expects these policies to affect the market. Fair enough. In
fact, I will go a step further. Requiring trivial disclosures with
little expected effect once more risks the placebo effect of regulation—the illusion that regulation addresses a problem when
it in fact does not. Furthermore, requiring additional disclosure
risks crowding out information actually useful to the average
investor.
Dodd-Frank mandates disclosures to be made in proxy
statements.215 This information is thus made more visible to
investors. Rather than combing websites or European regulatory filings, analysts merely have to read SEC filings that are
readily accessible online.216 Still, proxies contain a great deal of
information, and some research suggests that this disclosure is
“noisy” and easy for investors to ignore.217
Disclosure requirements are easy to impose, largely because they promise to thread the needle between firm autonomy and government regulation. Although conservatives will
gripe about the compliance costs and litigation risks imposed
by these legal mandates, they have much to commend them.
Instead of deciding what corporations should actually do in the
highly politicized realm of executive compensation, corporations are merely required to disclose what they are doing.218
Yet increased disclosure in this area seems to have led only to
higher corporate pay packages and an increase in relatively

213. Cf. id. at 65–66 (explaining that ethics code disclosures would be easier to access if it were available from a centralized SEC source).
214. Cf. id. (noting that website information about ethics codes is often deleted by companies after a year).
215. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010).
216. Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 192, at 1.
217. See id. at 45 (“[P]roxy disclosure is muddled disclosure, providing
companies with the opportunity to obscure negative information by disclosing
it along with a plethora of other matters. If investors have a large amount of
information to process and only limited time and attention (as they do), then
disclosing information in a ‘noisy’ setting may distract investors from otherwise pertinent information.” (citing DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ATTENTION AND
EFFORT 5–11 (1973))).
218. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951.
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low-salience information, with little promise of true change.219
Particularly given the investor myopia documented in Part I,
disclosure of pay packages that motivate managers to pursue
short-term gain at the expense of long-term risks for the firm
may do nothing more than increase the attractiveness of the
firm to similarly short-term investors.
B. INDEPENDENCE
I have written in the past on the fetishization of independence as a governance goal.220 Here I will observe only that a
regulatory focus on independence reflects a misplaced conviction that problems often lie in hidden ties between management and the board that result in rent-seeking. From a proindependence perspective, the ideal board member is defined by
the absence of conflict rather than the presence of any affirmatively good quality, such as business acumen, specific industry
knowledge, or financial sophistication. This section will discuss
independence only briefly in part because the basic point is
simple: while a lack of independence may have intensified the
financial crisis, board independence was not the problem.
Treasury regulations promulgated under EESA and ARRA
required that TARP recipients establish compensation committees composed solely of “independent” members of the company’s board of directors.221 Post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), these requirements already applied to most publicly traded companies
via stock exchange rules.222 Even before the recent financial
crisis, many large private companies had already conformed to
this requirement, taking the precautionary approach of follow-

219. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Washington’s Plans May Result in Even
Higher Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2009, at A15 (“The government
also has tried to regulate executive compensation by requiring greater disclosure of the details of compensation plans. Perversely, this too has contributed
to an increase in executive pay. How so? No self-respecting board of directors
is willing to admit that their company’s CEO is below average. So anytime the
new disclosures indicate that an executive’s pay is below average in any way, a
pay increase is ordered.”).
220. See generally Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33
J. CORP. L. 447 (2008).
221. 31 C.F.R. §§ 30.1–.4 (2009).
222. Order Approving NYSE & NASD Proposed Rule Changes Relating to
Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,175 (Nov. 12, 2003) (approving
NYSE Final Rule codified at NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A (2002)
and NASD Amendments to Rules 4200 and 4350(c)).
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ing corporate governance best practices.223 The new rules thus
called on public companies to do what they already largely had
done.
Conflicts in outside rating agencies may well have exacerbated the financial crisis by creating seemingly independent
evaluators that actually tailored their ratings to the needs of
their clients, the institutions offering the securities.224 This
was, and is, a genuine problem, which Dodd-Frank addresses
much as SOX had previously addressed conflicts between corporate managers and outside auditors.225 In contrast, within
corporations or banks there were few allegations of boards or
board committees having ties to executives or managers that
skewed their compensation. Although compensation schemes
may have been marked by flaws, those flaws seemed rarely to
involve classic cases of conflict that an independent compensation committee seeks to avoid, such as overpaying a trader who
was a director’s or officer’s brother or former boss, for example.
Despite the lack of a demonstrated problem with compensation
committee independence, the general approach of EESA and
ARRA seems to be that independence is good, and more independence is better. Given the preexisting prevalence of independent compensation committees, imposing an independence
requirement on TARP beneficiaries226 was a near-costless governance reform.
Dodd-Frank broadened the independent compensation
committee requirement to include all public companies.227 It
specified that, when promulgating rules regarding defining independence, the SEC should consider “the source of compensation . . . , including any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee” paid to the director and whether the director is
affiliated with the issuer or a subsidiary.228 The regulatory presumption again appears to be that where there is a problem, its
223. See generally FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEST
PRACTICES 84 (2006) (asserting that private companies should retain compensation committees).
224. See Lynn Bai, The Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies:
Are They Effective Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 47, 47–48 (2010).
225. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010).
226. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111, 122 Stat. 3765, 3776–77).
227. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952.
228. Id.
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root must lie in a hidden conflict of some kind, even though the
existence of such conflicts was already extremely unlikely given
the near-universality of independent compensation committees.
The real conflict is structural. Excessive compensation is
more likely the product of increased use of compensation consultants and benchmarking against the packages offered to
comparable executives within the same industry.229 Use of consultants tends to inflate fees.230 A 2007 Corporate Library Report, for example, concluded that “companies using consultants
offer significantly higher pay than companies not using consultants and that engaging the services of a compensation consultant does not appear to increase the effectiveness of incentive
229. See Macey, supra note 219.
230. Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and “Independent” Compensation Consultants, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 247, 248 & n.2 (2010).
This correlation has been largely attributed to the use of compensation consultants with significant conflicts of interest, which can arise when a compensation consultant provides other services to a company (e.g., “employee benefit
administration, human resource management, and actuarial services”) at the
same time as it provides advice on compensation. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS 1–2, 6 (Comm. Print 2007)
[hereinafter Waxman Report]. According to the Waxman Report, in 2006, over
one hundred of the Fortune 250 companies used compensation consultants
with such conflicts of interest. Id. at 9. The twenty-five Fortune 250 companies
that used the most conflicted compensation consultants paid their CEOs a sixty-seven percent higher median salary than the median salary paid by Fortune 250 companies that did not use conflicted consultants. Id. at 6. Another
source of consultant conflict comes from the fact that compensation consultants traditionally have been hired by management—on whose pay the consultant is supposed to objectively advise and from whom the consultant expects
future business—rather than the compensation committee. Murphy & Sandino, supra at 252; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
751, 772 (2002) (“Because managers choose which compensation consultants to
hire, the consultants have a clear incentive . . . to make recommendations favorable to managers . . . . Thus, the information presented and the way it is
framed will be chosen with an eye toward maximizing managers’ compensation.”). Some studies have found, on the contrary, that consultant conflicts of
interest might not relate to increases in executive compensation. For example,
while concluding that CEO compensation was indeed higher in companies that
used compensation consultants that provided other services, Murphy and
Sandino found surprising evidence that CEO compensation was lower when
the compensation consultant was retained by management. Murphy & Sandino, supra, at 260; see also Brian Cadmun et al., The Incentives of Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 263, 278 (2010) (“[W]e are
unable to find evidence linking potential conflicts of interest of compensation
consultants to more lucrative CEO pay packages.”). Even if conflicts of interest
do occur, criticism focuses at the level of consultants, not with the directors
themselves. Increased director independence thus serves little purpose.
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plans.”231 The ramifications of increased compensation committee independence are thus relatively modest, as are the payoffs
of this reform.232
Popular discontent regarding high levels of executive compensation undeniably exists.233 Yet the regulatory tools employed to address this concern—increased independence and
heightened disclosure—are of little practical significance as a
curative. Widespread use of independent compensation committees and disclosure, the main regulatory tools of the past
two decades, have failed to solve this problem. The logical alternative, both in reining in compensation and in addressing
short-termism more generally, is the politically unpalatable
path of substantive government regulation.
C. SUBSTANTIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Dodd-Frank has increased capital requirements for large
banks.234 It also has widened the scope of regulation for nonbank financial companies that pose risks to the country’s financial stability.235 The bailout regulations limited executive compensation to $500,000 for recipient firms236 and prohibited
golden parachutes.237 One can debate whether executive pay is
excessive and should be regulated, but substantive regulation
that sets clear limits—such as the European Union’s recent
move to place ceilings on banker bonuses238—is a more coherent way of holding down executive pay than offering shareholders a vote on that pay or forcing companies to disclose comparisons of CEO compensation to that of the rank-and-file or
231. Murphy & Sandino, supra note 230, at 248 n.2.
232. Id.
233. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 585 (2007) (discussing concerns about the
rising level of CEO compensation).
234. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 171(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1436–38 (2010).
235. Id. § 113.
236. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 302, 122 Stat. 3765, 3909–10.
237. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act § 111 to include § 111(b)(3)(C)).
238. Banks must defer forty to sixty percent of bonuses for three to five
years, and at least half of the nondeferred (that is, immediately paid) portion
must be in securities linked to the bank’s performance. Nikki Tait, EU Parliament Backs Tough Bonus Rules, FIN. TIMES, (London) July 7, 2010. Thus,
only twenty to thirty percent of the bonuses would be in cash. Id.
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compensation structures, or evaluating their riskiness.239 Substantive choices on pay are more politically risky than disclosure because they involve backing a particular position, and political realities may preclude imposing hard compensation caps
on CEOs.240 But pretending, in the face of the current investment landscape, that shareholder empowerment mechanisms
like say-on-pay and increased disclosure will constrain pay is
disingenuous.241 Short-term investors want short-term managerial incentives, and disclosure of or votes on these incentives
will only empower shareholders to reinforce those preferences.
D. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE INTERMEDIARY
If a problem inheres in the disconnect between the longterm beneficial owners of stock and the short-term vehicles
they invest in, then a logical regulatory fix involves policing the
intermediary. Congress considered, but ultimately declined to
incorporate into Dodd-Frank, a fiduciary standard for brokerdealers. Congress, however, did direct the SEC to undertake a
study on the matter and granted the SEC discretionary authority to adopt rules on the subject.242
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine has offered a number of intriguing solutions, all aimed at aligning the interests of long-term
owners and the institutional investors that manage their money.243 Strine’s proposals include:
1) pricing and tax strategies to encourage investing and discourage
churning by institutional investors and “fund hopping” by end-user
investors;
2) enhanced requirements for institutional investors to factor concern about fundamental risk, leverage, and legal compliance into
their investing and corporate governance decisions;
3) requirements that investment manager compensation be aligned
with the investment horizons of end-user investors;
4) considering a mandated separation of funds managing 401(k) and
college savings investments from more liquid investments, and requiring investing practices consistent with retirement and college investment objectives;
239. See id.
240. Liz Alderman, Cap on Bank Bonuses Clears Hurdle in Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 13653621.
241. Colin Barr, Why ‘Say on Pay’ Won’t Work, CNNMONEY, Nov. 16, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/16/news/shareholders.pay.fortune.
242. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 913(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1824 –25 (2010).
243. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35,
at 18–19.
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5) requirements that index funds vote shares and engage in activism
in a manner consistent with the funds’ commitment to hold the entire
benchmark index;
6) leverage limitations, broader disclosure and other regulations for
hedge funds that decrease the ability and incentive of these funds to
effectively push public corporations into risky business decisions;
7) mandating that institutional investors disclose fuller and more
timely information about their economic interests (including their
ownership of derivatives and short positions) and about their voting
and share lending policies;
8) restoring the sophisticated investor exception to allow[ the
wealthy to engage in risky investments], and requiring pension, charitable, and governmental investment funds to only invest through investment advisors covered by the 1940 Act; and
9) prohibiting pension, charitable, and governmental investment
funds from relying on the advice of proxy advisory services unless
those services give voting advice based on the economic perspective
and goals of an investor intending to hold her stock for at least five
years.244

These proposals all involve changing the incentives of intermediaries to make them focus on the longer-term investing
horizon of investors and, hopefully, to take more responsibility
for the votes and choices they make as investors in public companies.245 At the least, these proposals thus represent a muchneeded recognition of the short-term/long-term disconnect. This
is not the first time institutional investors have offered a
tempting reform target.246 The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) established a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff with the largest financial interest—
usually an institutional investor—be appointed lead plaintiff in
a securities class action,247 relying on the “money” to do the
monitoring.248 Subsequent evidence revealed an unwillingness
of some institutional investors to serve249 or even to collect
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do
Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 855 (2002) (“Commencing two decades ago, and continuing
today, the institutional investor is the most significant focus in reform efforts
for securities markets and the American corporation.”).
247. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104 -67,
§ 101, 109 Stat. 737, 738–42.
248. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2053 (1995).
249. Charles Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors to
Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
471, 471 (2008).
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money from class action settlements.250 The legacy of the
PSLRA teaches us that policing would be required, either by
investors or the government, to ensure that the new requirements of the Strine proposals would be met.
Institutional investors introduce agency costs of their own,
which undermine their ability to play an effective monitoring
role. Mutual fund managers are rationally unwilling to invest
resources in monitoring portfolio companies when that will increase their costs. Bank trust departments have an institutional interest in keeping their client companies happy, as do insurers and mutual fund companies, which often vie for the
pension and the defined contribution business of portfolio companies.251 Strine’s suggestions begin to address these problems
but require monitoring of their own.252 The government must
make decisions as to which pricing and tax strategies discourage churn and fund hopping, ensure that institutional investors
are focusing on “fundamental risk, leverage, and legal compliance” (suggestions 1–2).253 It must also decide whether manager compensation is in fact aligned with the interests of longterm end investors (suggestion 3).254 Similarly, an agency must
review whether retirement and college savings funds are invested consistent with their objectives, that index funds engage
in appropriate activism, and that proxy services are basing
their advice on the perspective of a long-term investor (suggestions 4–6, 9).255 Additionally, requiring disclosure presumes
that someone—again, a government agency or investors—is
processing the disclosed information (suggestions 6–7).256 As we
have seen, however, the average mutual fund investor, at least,
is unlikely to monitor such disclosures very closely.
The solutions rely on disclosure and thus are limited to the
extent that ultimate investors are unwilling to invest time and

250. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through
Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58
STAN. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005).
251. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 5, at 1754.
252. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35,
at 18–19.
253. Id. at 18.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 18–19.
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effort in learning about the funds in which they invest.257 To
the extent that the government provides this monitoring role,
disclosure-based solutions will involve bureaucrats in making
choices about appropriate risk levels—choices that inevitably
will be criticized as unduly conservative or risky when the next
bubble surfaces.
E. THE MARKET? THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF TARGET-DATE
FUNDS
Ideally, the market would provide investment vehicles specifically designed for long-term holders.258 Indeed, one could
point to target date funds (TDFs, also called lifecycle funds) to
argue that it has.259 In theory, these funds ideally fit the interests of the long-term investor.260 They start out with a high level of risk (i.e., highly exposed to stock) and automatically adjust
asset allocations over time to end at the target date (which is
often the retirement date for the investor) with a much more
conservative portfolio.261 This gradually shifting asset mix is
poetically termed the fund’s “glide path.”262 The idea is that a
forty-year-old investor starting a job in 2010 and expecting to
retire at seventy would pick a target-date fund of 2040.263 At
the beginning, the fund’s holdings would be mostly stocks and
stock funds.264 It would automatically rebalance according to its
preset glide path, so that by the target date it would hold a conservative mix of investments, with a strong emphasis on highgrade bonds.265 It is, in short, the nature of target-date funds to
focus on the long term.
257. See Fisch, supra note 27, at 879. (“[T]he modern institutional investor
itself functions much like the Berle and Means corporation.”).
258. See, e.g., Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra
note 35, at 18 (noting that the government could impose such a separation, as
explained in Strine’s fourth suggestion).
259. See Vallapuzha V. Sandhya, Agency Problems in Target-Date Funds
15 (Mar. 14, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1570578.
260. See id.
261. CRAIG COPELAND, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., USE OF TARGETDATE FUNDS IN 401(K) PLANS, 2007, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.ebri
.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_3-2009_TgtDtFnds.pdf.
262. Id. at 16.
263. Id. at 7.
264. David K. Randall, Risks and Rewards of Target-Date Funds, FORBES,
July 22, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/21/target-date-retirement-personal
-finance-target-date-funds.html.
265. Id.
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Even so, these funds present two distinct problems. First,
they are designed and marketed for unsophisticated or timepressed target-fund investors, and their purchase is often not
even the product of conscious choice. Second, the details of target-fund implementation create a heightened risk of vertical
agency costs. As to the first problem, TDFs are a popular
means of implementing a “set-it-and-forget-it” style of investing, one based on behavioral economics’ insights into investor
behavior and “nudging.”266 The Pension Protection Act of 2006
(PPA) responded to these insights by putting in place a sign-up
structure that simplified the process for employee enrollment
in 401(k) plans.267 In particular, PPA requires employees who
do not desire to save for retirement to opt out of, rather than
opt into, 401(k)s.268 One of the permissible default choices employers can select for their employees under the Act is the target-date fund, and many employers use TDFs as their default
investment.269 After automatic enrollment was introduced,
“participation rates doubled and 80% of employees accept the
default savings rate and default investment fund.”270 TDFs
consequently have proliferated to the point that they now
represent nearly seven percent of total 401(k) assets,271 and
some $270 billion in assets.272 Their privileged status as default
investment vehicles means that TDFs represent a considerable
portion of a huge pool of investments “chosen” by retirement
plan participants without actual thought being given to their
merits vis-à-vis other investment vehicles. Any move to em-

266. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE 4 (2004) (discussing
“research findings from psychologists, economists, market researchers and decision scientists, all related to choice and decision making”); RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 8 (2008) (“[A] nudge is any factor that
significantly alters the behavior of Humans.”).
267. Investment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund
Names and Marketing, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920 (proposed June 16, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 270).
268. Id. at 35,921 (explaining that the Department of Labor designated
TDFs as a qualified default investment alternative under the PPA).
269. Id. at 85,791–92 (citing study showing seventy percent of U.S. employers now use TDFs as a default).
270. Sandhya, supra note 259, at 17.
271. YOUNGKYUN PARK, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., INVESTMENT
BEHAVIOR OF TARGET-DATE FUND USERS HAVING OTHER FUNDS IN 401(K)
PLAN ACCOUNTS 2 (2009), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_
Notes_12-Dec09.TDFs.pdf.
272. Investment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund
Names and Marketing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,921.
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power, or even inform, these most passive of investors is therefore suspect.
The second problem presented by TDFs stems from their
“fund-of-fund” investing approach.273 Rather than investing in
individual companies, TDF managers tend to invest in mutual
funds, a feature that means that agency costs might be even
more pronounced in the case of TDFs than in the typical
fund.274 Although the academic literature on this subject is limited, one troubling study found that TDFs underperform balanced funds with similar asset allocations.275 The authors of
the study attributed this underperformance to a preference of
the TDFs to invest in funds within their own fund families,
thus generating a “double dip” in management fees for the
holding company owning the related funds.276 The study concluded the TDF investments enrich the overall fund company
with high expense ratios, rather than optimally serve the interests of investors.277
Target-date funds received congressional attention in 2009,
when it was reported that the “average loss in thirty-one funds
with a 2010 target date was . . . 25%.”278 One 2010 fund lost
forty-one percent in 2008 due to heavy exposure in stocks, an
allocation that surprised many observers given the proximity of
the fund to its target date.279 On June 16, 2010, the SEC proposed new rules on how target-date funds may be marketed in
response to concerns that investors did not understand the
funds and underestimated the degree of risk associated with
the investments due in part to inadequate disclosures.280 The
proposed rules require that if a TDF has a date in its name, it
273. Sandhya, supra note 259, at 3, 19.
274. Id. at 6.
275. Id. at 39.
276. Id. at 15–16. Unsurprisingly, the mutual fund company that serves as
the employer’s investment advisor generally selects funds from its own family
of funds as the employer’s default option. For example, Fidelity’s TDFs invest
in Fidelity stock and bond funds.
277. Id. at 4, 21.
278. Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial
Uncertainty, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61, 62 n.11 (2009).
279. Namely, Oppenheimer Transition 2010. Cynthia Lin, SEC Proposes
New Disclosure Rules for Target-Date Funds, MARKETWATCH, June 17, 2010,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-proposes-new-target-date-fund-rules-2010
-06-17.
280. Investment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund
Names and Marketing, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920, 35,922 (proposed June 16, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 270).
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must convey information about the asset allocation at that target date.281 More generally, the rules require enhanced disclosure of a TDF’s glide path in its marketing materials.282
The regulatory mismatch is clear in the SEC’s own proposed rule: target-date funds have been used largely as a default for employees who do not opt out of 401(k) participation.283 These investors have not made a conscious investment
choice, let alone seen or processed any marketing literature at
all. Further disclosure will be lost on them. Even investors who
consciously choose TDFs are either financially unsophisticated
or too busy to make careful investment choices.284 More disclosure to investors of this sort is unlikely to help remedy problems with target-date funds. Employers could theoretically
serve a monitoring role, but most employers use mutual fund
companies as investment advisors, and are steered into those
very companies’ own TDFs.285 Similarly, disclosure cannot address the fund-of-fund problem, since inattentive investors will
not focus on the problems this structure poses.
The TDF case study reveals a clear case of the dangers of
separating ownership from ownership. Indeed, because of the
fund-of-fund investing favored by TDFs, an employee is three
times removed from any actual corporate profit generation because she invests in a mutual fund that invests in other mutual
funds in a diversified portfolio.286 There is nothing to guarantee
her that either her TDF or the funds in which it invests are
making long-term choices in the investor’s interest.287 Instead,
they appear to be lining their pockets with layer upon layer of
fees.288 Worse still, in an environment in which the investor has
not made a conscious investment choice at all, the SEC’s solution is to require more disclosure. It would be hard to find a
better example of regulators’ failure to address the root causes
of the problems long-term investors face in a short-termist
world.
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CONCLUSION
The underlying concern that Congress sought to address in
Dodd-Frank is that short-termism causes systemic risk. Regulatory responses to the bailout have fallen back on familiar
tools like shareholder empowerment, disclosure, and independence, with no acknowledgement that the investing landscape
has changed in ways that make traditional regulatory approaches unlikely to advance underlying regulatory aims. This
Article makes no attempt to offer a grand solution to the resulting problems. Instead, it focuses on bringing those problems into clearer view. Without an understanding of the challenges
posed by a new financial world in which ownership is separated
from ownership, governmental reform efforts will not work and
indeed may compound real-world difficulties.
The conclusion may well be that there’s no such thing as a
free lunch. Ideally, we want public corporations to be monitored
by sophisticated long-term investors that have the motivation
to watch closely. But rational shareholders often follow a portfolio theory of investing that focuses on the diversification of
assets. This style of investing negates incentives to use the
tools of shareholder empowerment—proxy access, say-on-pay,
even disclosure—which recent financial reform has offered. The
better choice appears to be carefully chosen forms of substantive governmental regulation—politically costly though it may
be—or restructuring the law to realign the incentives of institutional investors with those of long-term shareholders.

